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ABSTRACT
An Analysis of a Botnet Toolkit and a Framework for a Defamation Attack
Thomas Ormerod
Botnets continue to undermine the security of the Internet. They have evolved in both their
level of sophistication and ability to cause harm. A driving factor for the use of botnets is
their ability to generate a proﬁt using traditional malware attacks on a large scale. Attacks
of particular concern are those that harvest credentials for online ﬁnancial services and
transactions. Even with advances in malware detection, botnets continues to infect systems
with relative ease, obtaining victims’ sensitive information for the attacker’s gain.
In this thesis, we ﬁrst analyze a popular toolkit, Zeus, used to create botnets. Zeus is pri-
marily used to steal victims’ sensitive information and it employs obfuscation techniques,
making it a challenging and interesting case study. The analysis illustrates the added dif-
ﬁculty of obfuscation and the revealed botnet architecture once removed. In addition, we
describe methods to extract the encryption key and communications. We also present a
conceptual framework for defaming botnets through supplying falsiﬁed credentials to the
operators of botnets. This framework targets botnet toolkits by diluting stolen credentials
with false ones, and providing an opportunity for law enforcement to apprehend end-users.
The overarching goal of our framework is to defame the toolkit used to perform the attack;
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making it an unproﬁtable tool. Furthermore, we analyze the affect our framework will have
on the Internet black market and illustrate the defamation approach using Zeus as a case
study. Finally, we test behavioural methodologies aimed at identifying key information to
be used in the defamation framework.
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The Internet is arguably one of the greatest achievements of mankind. There is little doubt
of its importance for a business and the public’s reliance on it to perform a number of tasks.
From its infancy as a mechanism to share information between researchers, to its current
form as a global platform used for email, advertising, commerce, communication, and
gaming, it has become a vital resource to our daily lives. Unfortunately, this fact has been
also recognized by criminals, who see the Internet as a less risky (than traditional crimes)
and highly proﬁtable mechanism to conduct illicit activities. Some examples of this type
of crime include spamming, identity theft, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) [29]
attacks.
Of particular concern is the ease with which identity theft can occur. Much of our daily
activities involve online services such as email, Internet banking, and e-commerce. An
attacker needs only steal the credentials used to access these services in order to assume
a user’s identity. The credentials used to access each of these online services is equally
sensitive. With email credentials one gains knowledge of many services registered with
that email address and, since many services offer password reset through email, attackers
may gain access to those services as well. Theft of Internet banking credentials can lead to
unauthorized transfers, and theft of credit card information can lead to traditional carding
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schemes and fraudulent purchases.
Botnets [30] are the primary platform used to perform these attacks. Botnets can per-
form a variety of Internet crimes at much larger volumes and have introduced a new busi-
ness model where infected systems may be rented to third parties to conduct further illicit
activities.
The credentials stolen by botnets may be sold in the black market of the Internet to those
who specialize in extracting funds from these kinds of accounts. Sales generally take place
on underground forums and Internet Relay Chat (IRC) servers. In the case of credentials
for ﬁnancial services, the purchaser makes use of money mules to siphon the funds. This
scarce resource is often attracted through fake job offers where the employee is tasked with
receiving the funds into their accounts, withdrawing the funds and transferring the funds to
their employer, minus a commission, often through wire transfers.
Another traditional method used to perform identity theft is to direct users to phishing
sites. A phishing site is usually a replicated version of a website, controlled by an attacker,
whose sole purpose is to have a user enter login credentials into the, falsely represented, site
and record those credentials. The attacker may then login to the real website and perform
tasks as the user whose credentials were stolen. A user is usually directed to these phishing
sites through links in emails. These emails employ social engineering to encourage the
user to follow the link. Phishing sites continue to be an active problem; however, with
advances in phishing site detection and alert-services, such as Google Safe Browsing [21]
and Microsoft’s SmartScreen Filter [40], users may better be able to protect their identities
from these attacks. A second, more stealthy method to perform identity theft, is to infect
victims’ machines with malware, which has shown more resilience to countermeasures.
Further compounding the problem is the advent of botnet toolkits. A botnet toolkit is
a suite of programs to build and operate a botnet. This adds new dynamics to the threat
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landscape. Where previously an attacker required some strong technical know-how to de-
sign and propagate a botnet, attackers can now purchase toolkits that are user-friendly, and
require little technical knowledge from the user. One of the most infamous botnet toolkits
is Zeus, which has become the number one botnet threat in America with 3.6 million com-
promised machines in the U.S. alone [37]. The Zeus botnet and its toolkit have become a
favourite tool for Internet criminals due to its user friendly interface, its competitive price
and its ability to easily facilitate identity theft activities. This toolkit allows a user to create
customized malware for the purpose of stealing credit card numbers, Internet banking cre-
dentials and many other forms of identity information to be sold in the black market [25].
1.1 Contributions
Our work presents an in-depth reverse engineering analysis of the Zeus crimeware toolkit [6]
where we illustrate the steps required to analyze this malware. We ﬁrst present an overview
of the toolkit. Next, we analyze communications between the command-and-control (C&C)
server and the infected hosts. The sequence of communications is illustrated, revealing the
periodic nature of transmissions. Following the network analysis, we present the reverse
engineering steps to deobfuscate the malware and provide a description of the installation
steps the malware takes upon infection of the host. We also extract conﬁguration infor-
mation from the binary and present its structure. We then describe a method to extract
the encryption key which is used to decrypt communications and decrypt the local storage
of both stolen information and additional conﬁguration information. Finally, we break-
down the structure of a message sent from the bot to the C&C server where we identify a
vulnerability with the implementation of the encryption algorithm Zeus employs.
The success of botnets is partly due to a strong economic incentive underlying every
level of the botnet business model. We address the problem of botnets, speciﬁcally those
created with toolkits, by exploring an economic attack against every level of the food chain:
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botnet toolkits sold by their authors allow any layman to generate his/her own customized
botnet and become a botmaster; botnet services sold by botmasters allow any criminal to
steal identities and credit card information; stolen credentials are then sold to those who
would make unauthorized transactions, transferring funds to money mules; and ﬁnally,
end-users wire-transfer funds, minus a commission, to their employers. Although some
preliminary efforts exist on botmaster trace-back, a countermeasure meets signiﬁcantly
more difﬁculties when the objective is to capture the botmaster or authors of a toolkit.
Those at the highest levels of the food chain are the most technology-savvy and elusive.
We address this concern by proposing a bottom-up approach to defaming botnet toolkits,
causing the business of making and selling toolkits an unproﬁtable endeavour [45].
1.2 Thesis Organization
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide background
on botnets, related attacks, the Internet black market and provide a review of related work.
In Chapter 3, we describe our reverse engineering efforts on the Zeus crimeware toolkit.
In Chapter 4, we describe our novel approach to defaming botnet toolkits. Finally, in




In this chapter, we describe botnets and related attacks, in particular those that are ﬁnan-
cially motivated. Next, we highlight research efforts to detect, mitigate and analyze the
botnet threat. We then describe the Internet black market economy and ﬁnally, highlight
research that studies this phenomenon and proposes countermeasures.
2.1 Botnets
A botnet is usually deﬁned as a network of compromised machines, individually known as
bots, that are used to perform coordinated attacks as commanded by their owner, known
as the botmaster. This deﬁnition distinguishes bots from other forms of malware, which
do not communicate nor perform coordinated attacks. Another unique feature of botnets is
that they primarily perform attacks that generate their botmaster a proﬁt.
As a member of a botnet, a bot has a life cycle that can be generalized as follows:
1. A system is infected using any number of malware propagation methods;
2. The infected system initiates contact with the botnet;
3. The infected system receives commands and executes attacks; and,
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4. The infected system may report attack results.
Bots may propagate themselves using any number of methods. For example, they may
use tradition worm propagation by scanning the network for vulnerable systems, or use
the botnet itself to email out copies of itself. Understanding how a botnet communicates
is very important in developing any mitigation strategy. Botnet communication structures
can be divided into two broad categories: centralized and decentralized.
• Centralized: Traditionally, botnets have a centralized network topology. They consist
of a C&C server that a botmaster uses to send commands to their bots. The ﬁrst
C&C servers were IRC channels. These were employed by Agabot, SDBot, and
SpyBot [4]. Upon infection, a bot would join a speciﬁc IRC channel on a speciﬁc
server and wait for speciﬁc messages that invoke programmed actions. A botmaster
will issue a command by posting a message to this channel. The C&C server pushes
the command to bots which then invoke the command with a relatively low latency.
As long as the infected machine is on and has an active Internet connection, it will
remain connected to the C&C server awaiting commands. The simplicity of creating
an IRC botnet led to its initial success; however, in recent years their popularity has
declined [5] due to the emergence of other types of botnets.
In contrast, Hyper Text Transfer Protocol (HTTP)-bots communicate with their C&C
server through port 80, the standard Internet port. Just like a user visiting a website, a
bot visits a server and communicates using the standard GET and POST commands a
web browser would use. This represents a pull style for communicating commands;
the bot itself must decide when to phone home and check for further instructions. A
bot may communicate with the server periodically, randomly or using a predeﬁned
custom protocol. Depending on the frequency of such communications, latency be-
tween a botmaster commanding an action and the botnet performing the action may
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be relatively high. In spite of the issue of high latency, botnets such as BlackEn-
ergy [43], Rustock [7], and clickbot.A [11] chose to communicate over HTTP, hiding
their communications among all other Internet trafﬁc. Another advantage of HTTP-
botnets are, that unlike IRC-based botnets where many networks may block ports
associated with IRC trafﬁc, networks rarely block port 80; and therefore, the com-
mands are more likely to reach the bot.
Centralized architectures, or topologies, are widely used for their effectiveness and
simplicity. The main weakness with this architecture is that if the C&C server is taken
ofﬂine, no further commands or updates may be issued to the botnet. Centralized
topologies can mitigate this risk through use of a bullet-proof hosting service [55],
which ignore website take-down requests, or have redundant C&C servers. This
ongoing battle between botmasters and those trying to secure the Internet has no
clear winner yet.
• Decentralized: In a decentralized network topology, there is no single C&C server
that is known to all botnet members. Peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols, usually based on
distributed hash tables (DHT) [1], are used to implement this architecture. In P2P,
each node will know some subset of the other nodes in order to propagate ﬁles that
contain commands. This makes the network resilient to take-down attempts. There
is no single node that, if removed, will signiﬁcantly impact membership. In addition,
some protocols are capable of reorganizing themselves to better handle the loss of
key nodes. The infamous Storm botnet [19] makes use of the Overnet Protocol, an
implementation of the DHT Kademlia, to organize its peers.
Decentralized botnets have a signiﬁcant advantage over a centralized architecture as
they are more difﬁcult to dismantle since there are no clear C&C servers. However,
it has been shown that they are vulnerable in other ways. A case study on Storm [26]
involved researchers inﬁltrating the botnet. They were able to dismantle Storm by
7
exploiting the P2P bootstrapping process, which relies on a static list of Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses or domain names contacted by new nodes wishing to join the
network. Controlling the IP addresses or domain names from the list prevents new
membership. This highlights a weakness in using some P2P systems, as there is no
authentication on new clients, making it easy to populate the botnet with machines
controlled by investigators and not controlled by the botmaster. In addition, a P2P
botnet can be prevented from growing by removing peers whose IP addresses are
used in the bootstrapping process. However, even with the limitations described,
future botnets may choose to adopt a P2P network topology, fostered by the success
of P2P botnets such as Storm and the increased complexity needed to dismantle this
style of botnet.
2.1.1 Botnet Attacks
As brieﬂy mentioned in Chapter 1, botnets are used to perform a variety of, in general,
ﬁnancially motivated attacks. The ﬁrst attack we describe is very familiar to anyone who
uses email. Email spam is an unsolicited email that is sent, in bulk, to a large number of
accounts. Typical email spam may be advertising products, directing users to phishing sites
or distributing malware. Much of the email spam is sent by botnets. The botmasters will
rent out their botnets to perform a spam campaign. Email spam from botnets may be more
difﬁcult to prevent than tradition email spam due to the number of different computers and
email accounts being used in the attack.
A classic botnet attack is a DDoS. A denial-of-service (DoS) typically targets a sys-
tem’s resources such as their central processing unit (CPU), memory or network connec-
tions [42]. One common resource attack is to overload the capacity of a network device
by sending a large number of packets. This prevents legitimate communications from oc-
curring. A second common attack, which affects a victim’s CPU, is a SYN ﬂood [57],
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where Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) SYN packets are continuously sent to a sys-
tem. Each packet requires a lookup by the CPU for existing connection information and
the creation of an entry if none is found. These incoming connection attempts are queued
and can quickly prevent other legitimate connection attempts. A DDoS is an extension of
a DoS attack that originates from many different systems simultaneously (i.e., distributed)
and, which increases the effectiveness of the attack. Botnets are a perfect vessel to perform
DDoS attacks. Botmasters make money from this type of attack either through extortion
or as a paid service to a competing organization. Extortion may occur by threatening a
company with shutting their servers down over a busy period such as the holiday season,
which could result in a huge loss to online sales. A company may choose to pay the bot-
master rather than risk greater ﬁnancial loss through reduced online sales and customer
dissatisfaction.
Another form of botnet attacks are click fraud attacks which target the pay per impres-
sion (i.e., click) advertising market. A botmaster commands bots to click on advertisement
banners, which pay a small amount of money per click to an account controlled by the
botmaster. An individual system will not generate large revenues, however, with a bot-
net, numerous systems in the order of hundreds, thousands or more can bring in a sizeable
proﬁt.
Finally, information theft and phishing are two attacks with the same goal of stealing
users’ conﬁdential information either with the objective of selling the stolen information or
using it directly:
• Information theft can be performed in a number of ways: key loggers record and send
a user’s keystrokes to an attacker’s database; and, form grabbers record information
entered into online forms, such as credentials and credit cards, during a user’s brows-
ing activity. Some security measures involve graphical keyboards; however, this type
of malware often comes with screen shot capture capabilities; and, malware may also
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steal information from protected storage such as cookies and password ﬁles.
• Phishing is the process of directing a user, often by email or instant message, to a fake
website that is meant to look like a real service the user uses. When they log in or
perform transactions they are inadvertently giving away their credentials and private
information. Botnets are used in phishing attacks in a few ways. They may be used
to spam phishing emails, host phishing sites, or an infected system may control a
user’s browsing experience such that they are redirected to a phishing site. This last
attack is particularly problematic as what the user sees is under the complete control
of the botmaster.
2.2 Botnet Detection
Botnet detection is one promising area of research to aid in mitigating the potential damage
a botnet can cause. The numerous proposed and implemented methods to detect botnets
are divided into two broad categories: host-based and network-based detection.
2.2.1 Host-based Detection
Since botnets are simply a collection of infected machines designed to receive commands
and perform coordinated attacks, traditional malware detection mechanisms can be used to
detect infections. Malware signatures have long been used by antivirus software to detect
infected systems. However, with increased use of various obfuscation techniques such as
encryption, polymorphism and metamorphism [56], traditional signature based approaches
have been less successful.
Host-based behavioural detection identiﬁes bot infections by observing systems be-
haviour and state. Detection occurs when an active system deviates from a normal systems
behaviour and state. Stinson and Mitchell [54] proposed a system called BotSwat, which is
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based on the theory that a system process is being externally or remotely controlled when it
uses network data (“an untrusted source”) as a system call argument (“a trusted sink”); this
is referred to, in literature, as taint-propagation analysis. This method is computationally
expensive and, like other anomaly-based detection methods, suffers from false positives.
Another method based on taint analysis is proposed by Yin et al. [59]. Panorama per-
forms “whole-system, ﬁne-grained taint tracking” on user input such as text entered by a
keyboard. The data is marked as tainted and monitored to see if it is transmitted via the
network. This propagation creates a signature that can be used to detect entire families of
malware. This is again a computationally expensive task and is designed to be performed
off-line.
Martignoni et al. [36] created an approach that utilizes data-ﬂow analysis of program
execution and system calls. They model a set of actions associated with malware such
as ‘proxying’, ‘keystroke logging’, ‘data leaking’, and ‘downloading and executing a pro-
gram’ using combinations of system calls. A strong work in misuse detection, it may still
be susceptible to evasion; malware can speciﬁcally alter the order of these events or use
non-standard techniques. Similarly, Liu et al. [34] proposed BotTracer, a program which
monitors system activities to detect three features modelled by the program, as critical for
a functioning bot: startup of a bot is automatic; a C&C channel must be established; and,
a bot will eventually perform attacks. This approach uses a combination of mechanisms to
detect each of these features. During an operating system’s (OS) startup phase, a whitelist is
created for services and other applications started by the OS. Any remaining processes that
exhibit outward bound trafﬁc are monitored. BotTracer monitors all inbound and outbound
trafﬁc on these suspicious processes and identiﬁes C&C servers using known characteris-
tics. It further monitor system calls associated with information harvesting and dispersion.
The system additionally ﬁlters out those processes that are started by user activity which
may lead to false negatives.
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2.2.2 Network-based Detection
Network-based detection moves the detection mechanism off the host and onto a network
device, which captures network trafﬁc for one or more hosts. This type of detection loses
some information only available on a host, such as intercepting network bound data before
it is encrypted by the host and, relevant system call information. Host-based detection
gives access to unencrypted information for identifying botnets and can use signatures
from system call traces; whereas network-based detection allows for monitoring numerous
systems simultaneously and may produce evidence of coordination amongst hosts, which
is potentially indicative of botnets. It can also be used to detect several network trafﬁc
anomalies related to trafﬁc volume, latency, unusual port use and Domain Name System
(DNS) query activity.
DNS activity can be used in a variety of ways to detect botnets. Ramachandran et
al. [47] propose using DNS blacklist counter-intelligence to determine botnet member-
ship. This is where a botmaster performs a lookup to ascertain if their bots are blacklisted.
Counter-intelligence watches for these queries to identify potential spam bots. However,
this is limited to certain categories of spam botnets. Perdisci et al. [46] propose a system to
analyze recursive DNS (RDNS) queries to detect fast-ﬂux service networks (FFSNs). FF-
SNs are similar to content delivery networks (CDNs) used for load-balancing and ensuring
high availability; however, they are designed to be used for malicious purposes, such as re-
solving IPs for phishing domains and, are generally comprised of infected hosts in a botnet.
They monitor DNS query trafﬁc, ﬁlter benign queries and cluster suspicious queries based
on trafﬁc statistics. Finally, they classify the clusters as legitimate CDNs or as malicious
FFSNs using further statistics such as total number of distinct resolved IPs and average
time-to-live (TTL).
Another method that monitors DNS trafﬁc is proposed by Choi et al. [8]. In this method,
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they detect botnet membership based on DNS queries made by bots occurring simultane-
ously. They use anomaly detection based on anomalous query rates and may be susceptible
to mimicry attacks.
Yen and Reiter [58] proposed a Trafﬁc Aggregation for Malware Detection (TAMD)
system, which uses three characteristics (destination, payload, and platform type) to aggre-
gate hosts and determine infected systems. These systems may be members of a botnet or
may be infected with other stealthy malware. They perform a horizontal correlation analy-
sis that looks for similarities in the three characteristics across a large enterprise network.
Horizontal correlation requires multiple infections by the same malware on the monitored
network. In a similar work, Gu et al. [22] propose BotMiner, which also correlates network
trafﬁc, although it uses different characteristics than TAMD. Speciﬁcally, they are interested
in “who is talking to who” (communication activities) and “who is doing what” (malicious
activities). They independently cluster these activities and then perform cross-cluster cor-
relation to determine those hosts partaking in both activities.
Karasaridis et al. [27] developed a methodology to track and detect IRC botnets on
large Tier-1 Internet Service Provider (ISP) networks. Their work is similar to BotMiner
in that they detect communication activities; however, they match these activity ﬂows to
known IRC botnet trafﬁc proﬁles. The main difﬁculty with these approaches is that botnets
are constantly changing their behaviour to circumvent such detection.
BotHunter, also proposed by Gu et al. [23], passively detects individual bots by corre-
lating intrusion detection system (IDS) alerts to a predeﬁned infection model. They per-
form vertical correlation, that is, correlating events that occur on a single host. Individual
infection stages are detected including inbound scanning, exploit usage, egg downloading,
outbound bot coordination dialogue, and outbound attack propagation. Two detection rules
are used based on the proposed infection model that consist of a partially ordered dialogue
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exchanged between the host and the external network. If these events occur within a suf-
ﬁcient temporal window, the host is deemed infected. There is a risk of false negatives if
key alerts are not raised by the IDS, or if there is a sufﬁcient delay between alerts.
2.3 Internet Black Market
The Internet black market plays host to numerous sales of illicit electronic goods such as
credit card information, banking and other online credentials, hacking services, botnets for
rent, and malware toolkits. In this section, we discuss the monetary beneﬁts of the market
and proposed countermeasures.
To illustrate the Internet black market, Kshetri [29] assesses the cost-beneﬁt structure of
cybercriminals. They propose a framework that outlines how the characteristics of the three
groups involved in cybercrime: law enforcement agencies, victims, and the cybercriminals,
shape the cybercrime landscape. There are four factors that increase the success of cy-
bercrimes and the conﬁdence of cybercriminals: a lack of conﬁdence in law enforcement,
weak defence mechanisms, low reporting rates, and businesses complying with demands
(i.e., extortion). They also propose an economic formula to represent the cost-beneﬁt anal-
ysis for a cybercrime where a cybercrime occurs if:
Mb + Pb > Ocp +OcmPaPc (1)
the monetary beneﬁts, Mb, plus the psychological beneﬁts, Pb, are greater than the
psychological cost, Ocp, plus the opportunity cost of conviction, Ocm, times the probability
of arrest, Pa, times the probability of conviction, Pc.
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2.3.1 Countermeasures
Franklin et al. [18] presented two attacks on the trust and rating system of the Internet black
market. In the ﬁrst attack, they create numerous identities that are then used to build up
each other’s reputation as reliable black market sellers. When a real offer is made on their
advertised goods, they accept the money; however, they do not provide the purchased item.
This affects the overall reputation of the market, reducing real black market activity. In the
second attack, they slander actual sellers to lower their reputation. These two attacks show
promise; however, their approach does not handle the case where credentials are not sold
in the black market.
Ford and Gordon et al. [15] present an attack on the ad revenue stream generated by
botnets. In this method, a distributed set of clients joins a botnet used for advertising.
These clients then artiﬁcially view or click ads. Although, initially this drives up proﬁts
for botmasters, the rate they are paid per impression or click is dependant on the number
of actual sales occurring. If clicks are not translated into purchases, the advertising client
will react by lowering the rate paid per click. Over time, the proﬁts for the botmaster will
diminish to the point where operating the botnet is no longer lucrative. This is an early
work that addresses the viability of an attack against a botnet’s business model.
Li et al. [33] present a work that utilizes honeypots to create uncertainty in the necessary
rental size of a botnet for a DDoS attack. They extend their work to generalize the botnet-
for-rent market as a whole [32]. In this attack, they intend to affect the proﬁt margins of
botmasters by reducing the effectiveness of their services. They ﬁrst create two equations
to calculate maximum proﬁts.
For the attacker:
max (Profit) = M − P × n (2)
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For the botmaster:
max (Profit) = P × n−m× k − a (N) (3)
M is the payment received by the attacker for successfully disabling the target site.
The rental price per bot is denoted by P and n is the minimum number of bots needed to
perform the attack. The cost to maintain bots is calculated as the cost to maintain a C&C
channel, m, times the number of C&C channels necessary to operate these bots, k. N is
the size of a typical botnet needed to support an active population n and a(N) is a penalty
function representing economic losses suffered from being detected and arrested.
They then demonstrate that having “virtual” machines join a botnet and not perform
attacks when commanded, decreases the overall market gains for running attacks. As there
is now greater uncertainty in any given bot contributing to the attack, an increasing number
of bots is required to successfully perform the attack. Since there are now additional bots
required in a botnet, there are new incurred costs associated with the added C&C channels
needed to operate the botnet. These have a direct affect in the penalty function as the botnet
has grown.
Although this attack shows promise for disrupting the market surrounding DDoS at-
tacks, it has not addressed a fundamental parameter in the existence of botnets which are
the malware authors who have created them. The approach described in Chapter 4, extends
the economic attack to lower the author’s proﬁts by targeting the botnet toolkits they sell.
Li and Schmitz [31] propose a framework that utilizes different kinds of honeypots
to facilitate attracting phishing activities and submitting fake credentials. Four types of
honeypots are used:
• A honeyed e-banking system as a phoneypot;
• A number of phoneytokens as fake credentials supported by the honeyed e-banking
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system;
• A number of spamtraps for attracting phishing emails and submitting phoneytokens
to phishing sites; and,
• A number of phoneybots for submitting phoneytokens to pharmers and phishing mal-
ware.
Phoneytokens are fake credentials created and used by e-banking systems for this pro-
cess. These tokens provide access to pseudo-real accounts that can be used in transactions.
When the spamtraps at the ﬁnancial institution receives a phishing email, they submit these
phoneytokens to the phishing universal resource locator (URL). The phisher will eventually
attempt to steal money from phoneytoken accounts. When a transfer occurs, the destination
account is ﬂagged as suspicious and is used to ﬂag future transactions within that account,
requiring the sending account to verify the transfer. This provides protection to real user’s
accounts. Throughout the process, the ﬁnancial institution reports phoneytoken activities
to authorities for investigative purposes. Their intent is to prevent phishing on real user
accounts once destination phishing accounts have been identiﬁed.
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Chapter 3
Analysis of the Zeus Crimeware Toolkit
3.1 Introduction
Zeus is a prevalent malware toolkit purchased with the intent of creating a Zeus botnet. It is
a favourite tool of hackers and presents an interesting challenge to analyze. In this Chapter,
we present a case study on an analysis of Zeus through reverse engineering. The purpose of
this analysis is to gain insight into its capabilities and sophistication. We ﬁrst describe the
toolkit by analyzing the included ﬁles. Following this analysis, we present the results from
constructing a Zeus botnet, using the analyzed ﬁles, in a virtual machine environment. This
allows us to understand its capabilities and analyze the communications that occur between
a bot and the C&C server. Next, we describe our efforts to reverse engineer two aspects
of the toolkit: a builder program used to generate an infection binary, and the resultant
binary used to infect systems with Zeus. Furthermore, this analysis exposes the obfuscation
layers that Zeus employs to conceal its mechanisms and evade signature detection. We also
describe outcomes of our reverse engineering analysis; a tool to automate the recovery of
the encryption key used for communications; and, a sample of a decrypted communication
session.
Chapter Organization: In section 3.2, we describe the toolkit and highlight its features
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and conﬁguration details. We follow this discussion, in section 3.3, with a breakdown of
the Zeus botnet communication structure, and observe the network trafﬁc between a bot
and the C&C server. In section 3.4, we present a detailed reverse engineering analysis of
the Zeus crimeware toolkit. The next section, section 3.5, describes a tool to automate the
recovery of the encryption key used for the bot communication, as well as the extraction of
the conﬁguration information from the binary bot executables. In section 3.6, we present
a sample of a decrypted communication session between an infected machine and a C&C
server. Finally, we summarize the analysis in section 3.7.
3.2 Description of the Zeus Crimeware Toolkit
The toolkit employs a number of programs and scripts to create and operate a Zeus botnet.
It can be used to create many smaller botnets, each managed from a different C&C server,
or one large botnet. The attacker is only limited by how many different networks of in-
fected machines they wish to manage. A Zeus botnet operates using HTTP and is generally
operated over the Internet. It can be used for any number of nefarious reasons, but, it is
most commonly used to control machines for the purpose of stealing credentials for ﬁnan-
cial gain. A Zeus bot has the ability to log user input as well as to capture and alter data
that is displayed to the user in their browser [25]. Stolen data may contain email addresses,
passwords, online banking credentials, credit card numbers, and TANs. However, since a
Zeus bot can be instructed to execute arbitrary code, the botnet can also act as a platform
to launch any number of other attacks such as, DDoS or spam.
In our analysis, we examine the Zeus crimeware toolkit v.1.2.4.2, which at the time
of analysis, was considered the latest stable publicly available version in the underground
community. Newer versions of Zeus are available; however, the core functionality remains
much the same. The core ﬁles contained in the Zeus crimeware toolkit can be grouped into
three categories (see Figure 1):
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Figure 1: Conﬁguration Files of Zeus
1. A C&C Server with installation scripts (C+C server);
2. A builder program with conﬁguration ﬁles (Builder.exe, Conﬁg.txt and Webinjects.txt);
and,
3. A generated bot executable and conﬁguration binary (Bot.exe and Conﬁg.bin).
Each category is described to highlight the capabilities of the Zeus crimeware toolkit
and is meant as a reference to facilitate analysis.
3.2.1 C&C Server with Installation Scripts
In the ﬁrst category the crimeware toolkit has a set of simple installation scripts to conﬁgure
the C&C server. The only pre-requisite is that a web server and a MySQL [10] database
are installed. The user browses to the web path install/index.php and follows the
resulting installation dialog. The installation script conﬁgures the C&C server with the
botnet name and the password necessary to communicate with the bots. It also creates
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a database, cpdb, to store information on the botnet and the information the botnet har-
vests. The database is used to store related information about the botnet and any updated
reports from the bots. For a bot to submit information to the C&C Server, and ultimately
the database, it must POST the information to gate.php. These updates contain stolen
information that is gathered by the bots from the infected machines. The botherder may
then view the information through the control panel by navigating to cp.php. This control
panel provides a user friendly interface to display the contents of the database as well as
to send updates and other commands to the botnet (see Table 3). We observed information
being submitted to gate.php and ultimately to the database, cpdb. The breakdown of
the communicated information is described in section 3.6.
3.2.2 Builder Program with Conﬁguration Files
The builder program is used to generate the bot executable and the dynamic conﬁguration
binary necessary for installing a bot, harvesting information and communicating with the
C&C server. When generating the ﬁles, the builder program uses information from two
ﬁles: config.txt and webinjects.txt. The builder program is a fully-ﬂedged
Microsoft Windows application with a user interface (see Figure 2).
Conﬁg.txt
The botnet conﬁguration information is composed of two parts: a static section and a dy-
namic section. When the builder program generates the bot executable, the static section is
embedded within the ﬁle. We observe the static structure during the analysis of the static
conﬁguration structure at the end of section 3.4.2. The dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle is the dy-
namic section compressed and encrypted by the builder program, and then written to ﬁle.
The conﬁguration ﬁle allows for customizing the bot as shown in Figure 3. The following
conﬁguration options are available:
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Figure 2: Zeus Builder Interface
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StaticConﬁg
• botnet - The name of the botnet that the bot should join.
• timer_conﬁg - Periodic timer variables for the frequency with which to download
updates to the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle. There are two numbers; the ﬁrst is how
long to wait, in minutes, between downloading the conﬁguration ﬁle, and the second
is how long to wait, in minutes, if there is an error before re-attempting the download.
• timer_logs - Periodic timer variables for the frequency with which to upload stolen
information to the C&C server. There are two numbers; the ﬁrst is how long to
wait, in minutes, between uploading the log, and the second is how long to wait, in
minutes, if there is an error before re-attempting the upload.
• timer_stats - A periodic timing variable for the frequency with which to upload sta-
tistical information on the bot to the C&C server. There are two numbers; the ﬁrst is
how long to wait, in minutes, between uploading the statistics, and the second is how
long to wait, in minutes, if there is an error before re-attempting the upload.
• url_conﬁg - The web location of the dynamic conﬁguration binary.
• url_compip - An external website whose page contents contain the bot’s externally
visible IP address, as well as the amount of kilobytes required to be retrieved from
the site to read the IP address.
• encryption_key - The key to decrypt the dynamic conﬁguration binary and encrypt
transmissions to the C&C server.
• blacklist_languages - A list of languages which are not supported by this botnet.
DynamicConﬁg
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• url_loader - The web location to download updated versions of the bot binary.
• url_server - The web location to POST stolen information to.
• ﬁle_webinjects - The ﬁle name of the WebInjects conﬁguration ﬁle used when the
builder generates the binaries.
• AdvancedConﬁgs - Additional web locations to download backups of the dynamic
conﬁguration ﬁle.
• WebFilters - A set of URLs that by default direct the bot to log information, or to not
log information by preﬁxing the URL with a ‘!’ symbol, or to direct the bot to take
screenshots of the page by preﬁxing an ‘@’ symbol on the URL. Screenshots may
be used for acquiring passwords entered through virtual keyboards in the web page.
• WebDataFilters - A list of pairs comprised of a URL and a string values that are used
to specify what information is logged.
• WebFakes - A list of pairs of URLs used for a phishing attack, where the ﬁrst URL
in the pair would be a website the user intends to navigate to and the second URL in
the pair is the website that the malware actually navigates the user to. The malware
does so without affecting the URL shown in the location bar of the web browser.
• TANGrabber - A set of rules to extract transaction authentication numbers (TANs)
used by some banks.
• DnsMap - Entries for the Windows hosts ﬁle. This can be used to effectively override
DNS lookups as the hosts ﬁle is checked before a DNS query is made.
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;"http://[WEB DOMAIN]" "http://[PHISING SITE]" "GP" "" ""
end
entry "TANGrabber"






Figure 3: Conﬁguration File config.txt
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WebInjects.txt
The webinjects.txt serves two purposes: ﬁrstly, it directs the bot to log speciﬁc in-
formation from a retrieved web page, and, secondly, instructs the bot to insert additional
HyperText Markup Language (HTML) code into retrieved pages. Figure 4 shows an exam-
ple of this ﬁle with the following explanation:
• set_url - The ﬁrst portion is a string pattern to match against web locations and
the second portion is a set of symbols. The entry set_url, indicates a start of a
rule. In the ﬁrst rule, it is a web page that contains an account balance. In the second
rule it is a login form. The symbols for set_url are:
G - Invoke this rule when the page is retrieved with a GET command.
P - Invoke this rule when the page is retrieved with a POST command.
L - This represents the switch to log additional information as shown in the ﬁrst
rule or, when L is not present, inject information as shown in the second rule.
• data_before - A string pattern to identify at what location, in the retrieved HTML,
to either begin logging information or injecting new HTML code.
• data_inject - Either a label for the extracted piece of information or the new
HTML code to inject.
• data_after - A string pattern to identify at what location, in the retrieved HTML,
to either stop logging information or to stop overwriting the retrieved HTML with
the injected HTML code.
Some examples of how this ﬁle can be used include: retrieving account balances, mod-
ifying the displayed balance, retrieving usernames or other personal information, and in-
jecting new ﬁelds into login forms such as a Social Insurance Number (SIN) or Debit Card
Personal Identiﬁcation Number (PIN) so the user divulges additional information.
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set_url */[WEB LOGIN PATH]* GP
data_before
Password: <input type="password" name="pwd" /><br />
data_end
data_inject




Figure 4: Web Injection File webinjects.txt
3.2.3 Generated Bot Executable and Conﬁguration Binary
The ﬁnal step of the builder program is to generate the bot executable and conﬁguration
binary. By performing a simple binary comparison, it can be determined that each instance
of the generated bot executable is different, indicating that some form of binary obfuscation
is employed.
Before describing these ﬁles, there are two additional steps we took in this analysis: we
perform a network communication analysis in section 3.3, and we de-obfuscate the binaries
at the start of section 3.4, the reverse engineering analysis. The network analysis provides
us with insight during the reverse engineering stages, and de-obfuscating the binaries is
necessary before we can reverse engineer their functionality.
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3.3 Zeus Botnet Network Analysis
We now describe the network communication that occurs between the C&C server and a
newly infected machine. The purpose of this analysis is to aid in the creation of detection
mechanisms. The test environment is as follows:
1. Two Windows machines were created in a virtual network environment.
2. The ﬁrst machine was setup as the C&C server. We conﬁgured a web server and
executed the Zeus installation scripts. This server hosts all the resources neces-
sary to operate the botnet which include the control panel (cp.php), the drop lo-
cation (gate.php), the MySQL database (cpdb) and the dynamic conﬁguration
ﬁle (config.bin).
3. In the second machine, we conﬁgured the malware by modifying config.txt to
have it communicate with our C&C server and then infected the machine with Zeus.
4. We created fake websites to reﬂect real scenarios of botnet attacks. All necessary
entries of the conﬁguration ﬁle as well as the web injects scripts are modiﬁed to
target the fake websites.
Using Wireshark [2], we collected network traces between the two machines for one
day. On the infected machine we navigated to the fake websites and then used login cre-
dentials, personal information, and credit card information for testing purposes.
Network communications between the C&C server and the infected machine were then
analyzed. From this analysis we were able to conﬁrm that Zeus uses HTTP to communicate
between infected clients and the C&C server. From these network traces, we observed
that the bot periodically checks the C&C server for a conﬁguration binary and also a bot
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Figure 5: Communication Pattern of Zeus
are encrypted. We have created a sequence of events to illustrate the communication pattern
that occurs between the C&C server and the infected machine:
1. The Zeus bot ﬁrst sends a request message GET /config.bin to initiate a down-
load of the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle from the location speciﬁed in the static section
of config.txt. This location can be any web server. For our purposes we used
the C&C server;
2. The contacted server then responds with the conﬁguration ﬁle config.bin. This
ﬁle can be decrypted by the infected machine using the conﬁguration key embedded
in the binary;
3. The infected machine contacts a URL speciﬁed in the static portion of the conﬁgura-
tion ﬁle for the purpose of determining its externally facing IP address;
4. The server then responds with the IP address in plain text; and,
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5. The bot posts status information to the C&C server at a conﬁgurable web site. For
our purposes the message was POST/gate.php.
The main ﬁndings of this analysis are shown in Figure 5, which depicts the sequence of
communications that occur between the two machines. Some communications are repeated
periodically. The bot will check for an updated conﬁguration ﬁle, send new status informa-
tion and upload stolen information in a periodic fashion based on the intervals speciﬁed in
the static portion of the conﬁguration ﬁle used to generate the bot.
3.4 Reverse Engineering Analysis
We now describe the reverse engineering analysis we performed on the Zeus crimeware
toolkit components. We speciﬁcally analyzed two binaries: the Zeus builder and Zeus bot
executable. The analysis provides insight into the changes that occur on a user’s system,
such as modiﬁcation to the ﬁles that run during the operating system’s (OS) startup, new
network trafﬁc, changes to the registry, new ﬁles created and the infection of existing pro-
cesses.
We use IDAPro [50] to analyze the binaries. IDAPro is the industry leading disassem-
bler which interprets a string of bytes as mnemonics of machine instructions.
3.4.1 The Zeus Builder Program Analysis
Zeus builder is the ﬁrst component of the crimeware toolkit. It is used to conﬁgure a Zeus
botnet and generate the bot executables. It makes use of two conﬁguration ﬁles as inputs to
customize its functionality. In Figure 2, we can see the functionality provided through the
graphical user interface (GUI).
Before analysis of the functionality could take place, we were required to remove an
obfuscation layer. Using PEiD [53] we observed that the builder is packed using UPX [44]
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File Description
C:/WINDOWS/system32/sdra64.exe A copy of the bot executable.
C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/local.ds A local copy of the generated dy-
namic conﬁguration ﬁle.
C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/user.ds A data ﬁle used to store the users’
personal information logged by the
bot.
Table 1: Description of the Files Created During the Bot Infection
and must ﬁrst be unpacked using UPX. After this was completed, we used the PaiMei
reverse engineering framework [3], for its code coverage tracking and data ﬂow tracking
capabilities, to see which functions within the Zeus builder are invoked by a speciﬁc action
within the GUI. This immensely aids in reverse engineering, as it allows us to focus on a
few key subroutines at a time. The following summarizes the reverse engineering analysis
of the builder program.
• Conﬁguration Binary: This functionality generates the conﬁguration binary. It reads
in the dynamic section of config.txt and webinjects.txt and creates a bi-
nary structure of the information. Next it compresses and encrypts the entire structure
using RC4 [48] and the encryption key in config.txt.
• Zeus Bot Executable: This functionality generates the Zeus bot executable. It reads
in the static section of config.txt and creates a portable executable (PE). Much
of the compiled code and data structures are obfuscated using unique keys that are
generated randomly each time the function is invoked. The encryption key to decrypt
the conﬁguration binary is also embedded in the PE.
• Zeus Infection Removal: This functionality is useful if you accidentally infect your
system with Zeus. It detects the existence of registry entries and ﬁle locations on your
system (see Table 1). If detected, the program removes the registry entries, instructs


















Figure 6: Segments of the bot.exe Binary File
3.4.2 Zeus Bot Binary Analysis
As shown in Figure 6, the bot binary ﬁle contains four segments: a text/code segment,
an imports segment, a resources segment, and a data segment. We began our analysis at
the malware entry point (EP) that resided in the text/code segment. The initial analysis of
the disassembly showed that only a small part of the text/code block is valid computer in-
structions. This indicated that most of the binary is obfuscated, meaning that the computer
cannot use this code directly and must ﬁrst use procedures in the remaining valid code
blocks of the binary to de-obfuscate these sections.
De-obfuscation Process
Using the IDAPro debugger, we were able to debug the malware and step through the in-
structions to analyze and understand the logic of the de-obfuscation routines. Each routine
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De-obfuscation 2









Figure 7: De-obfuscated Code in Virtual Memory
revealed some information which is used by the other routines until all obfuscation layers
are removed.
The ﬁrst de-obfuscation routine contained a decryption key, 4-bytes in length, and a
one-byte long seed value. These two values are used to decrypt a block of data from the
text/code segment one byte at a time, rotating through the decryption key one byte at a time,
and performing a logical AND operation. The resulting decrypted data is then written into
virtual memory.
The result of the ﬁrst de-obfuscation routine revealed some new code segments. These
segments contain three de-obfuscation routines as shown in Figure 7. During our analysis,
the initial offset address of the memory for the code segments was 0x390000. This offset
location may change upon subsequent executions of the binary as it is determined by the OS
at runtime. Immediately following the second de-obfuscation routine there was an 8-byte
key that the IDAPro dissembler incorrectly identiﬁed as machine language instructions,
or opcodes. Figure 8 illustrates the location of the 8-byte key and shows that the bytes
are incorrectly interpreted by the disassembler as opcodes and presented as assembly code
mnemonics. This further complicates the analysis as the reverse engineer must identify
when these errors occur. In the following sequence of events, we explain the main logic of
the second de-obfuscation routine.
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Figure 8: The 8-byte Key
1. First, it copies two binary blocks from the text/code segment, concatenates them
together, and then writes them into the virtual memory. The ﬁrst text block contains
data with many zero value bytes that will be ﬁlled by the next text block as shown in
Figure 9.
2. The routine scans every byte of the ﬁrst text block and, when it encounters a hole
(zero byte), it will overwrite the zero-byte with the next available byte in the ﬁller
block. This is repeated until all holes are ﬁlled (see Figure 10).
The ﬁlled text segment is the main output of the second de-obfuscation routine. How-
ever, this text segment is still not fully de-obfuscated and, therefore, not interpreted as valid
computer instructions. By utilizing the 8-byte key, in Figure 8, the third de-obfuscation
routine starts decrypting the output of the second de-obfuscation. Similar to the ﬁrst de-
obfuscation routine, this routine utilizes an 8-byte key and performs an eXclusive-OR
(XOR) operation rather than a logical AND operation, again rotating through the key one
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Figure 9: Virtual Memory Used by the Second De-obfuscation Routine
byte at a time, and decrypting the text one byte at a time.
Finally, the fourth de-obfuscation layer contains heavy computations to initialize and
prepare some parameters for the rest of the malware operations. It uses the decrypted bytes
revealed by the previous routines to modify the rest of the text/code segment. This routine









00 42 E1 C1
50 00 B3 C1
12 2D 00 BD
00 F2 6C BB
7E 62 82 A4
7E 42 E1 C1
50 62 B3 C1
12 2D 82 BD
A4 F2 6C BB
Text with missing data
Filler text
Filled text
Figure 10: Result of the Second De-obfuscation Routine
Even though the text/code segment is now valid, the Zeus bot employs two additional
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layers of obfuscation. These two layers are de-obfuscated during the installation procedure.
They consist of logical loops that transform arbitrarily long strings into clear text. The ﬁrst
routine is performed on a set of strings that the malware uses to load the dynamic link
libraries (DLLs), retrieve function names, and for other purposes during the installation
process. Similarly, the second routine is used to decrypt the URLs that were previously
embedded in the binary, from the static section of the conﬁguration ﬁle, when the binary
was generated by Zeus builder. The main logic of these two routines are described in
Algorithm 3.4.1 and Algorithm 3.4.2.
Algorithm 3.4.1: DECRYPT_STRING(enc_string)
seed = 0xBA;
String new_string = new String(enc_string.length());




new_string[i] = (enc_string[i] + seed) %256;




String new_url = new String(enc_url.length());




if (i%2 == 0)
then
new_url[i] = (enc_url[i] + 0xF6 - i * 2) %256;
else
new_url[i] = (enc_url[i] + 0x7 + i * 2)%256;
return (new_url)
Bot Installation Process
After the ﬁrst four de-obfuscation routines are executed, the malware begins the installa-
tion process. The installation process aims at preparing and then launching the malicious
activities of the malware. We now explain the main procedure of the installation process:
1. Zeus dynamically loads the LoadLibrary and the GetProcAddress methods
from Kernel32.dll library;
2. It decrypts a set of strings, which become DLL methods names, into the virtual mem-
ory according to Algorithm 3.4.1. Table 2 lists all of the Windows DLLs that Zeus
employs and the number of methods that are loaded from each one of them;
3. The LoadLibrary and the GetProcAddress methods are then used to load
further methods, as decrypted in step 2, from the Windows DLLs;
4. Zeus enumerates the current process table looking for targeted processes such as the
main process, outpost.exe, for the Outpost [51] personal ﬁrewall application
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Table 2: List of Windows DLLs Dynamically Loaded by the Bot Binary
from Agnitum Security and the main process, zlclient.exe, for the personal
ﬁrewall [35] from CheckPoint. If any of these processes are found, then Zeus aborts
the installation process;
5. Zeus appends the path C:/Windows/System32/sdra64.exe to the registry
key: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE/SOFTWARE/Microsoft/WindowsNT/
CurrentVersion/Winlogon/Userinit. This entry enables Zeus to initiate
its installation process again during Windows startup;
6. Finally, it injects the de-obfuscated Zeus logic from the memory address 0x400000
to 0x417000 into virtual memory allocated within winlogon.exe. Following
this step, Zeus passes control of this process by creating a new user thread, which is
immediately executed.
As mentioned in step 5, the bot follows these steps when the machine is restarted to
reinfect it. There are a few additional steps that are only performed during the initial Zeus
installation process, or when a new version of Zeus is installed. The routine creates a local
copy of the malware and stores it on the infected system to be activated anytime the system
is restarted. Below, we list the process to create a local copy of the malware.
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1. Zeus searches for any existing copies of a previous Zeus infection ﬁle, sdra64.exe,
and then erases it from the machine. This behaviour would occur when the Zeus bi-
nary ﬁle is being updated with a newer version of the malware.
2. It makes an exact copy of itself and then saves it to C:/Windows/System32/
sdra64.exe. To evade signature-based detection systems, it appends some ran-
domly generated bytes to the end of the ﬁle to ensure any future attempts to hash the
ﬁle will result in a different hash value.
3. In order to hide itself, the bot copies the modiﬁcation, access, and creation (MAC)
time information from the Ntdll.dll ﬁle, and applies them to sdra64.exe.
The intent of this is to make sdra64.exe appear as a Windows OS ﬁle.
4. To further hide the ﬁle, it sets the sdra64.exe ﬁle attributes to system and hid-
den, so that the user cannot see the ﬁle using the standard ﬁle explorer settings.
The installation procedure is continued by the user thread that was started in the win-
logon.exe process as described in step 6 of the Bot Installation Process. Once this
hand-off occurs, the currently running bot exits and leaves control to the injected thread
in winlogon.exe. The Zeus thread injects itself into another process, svchost.exe.
This injected thread initiates a communication channel with the C&C server to download
the latest updates of the conﬁguration ﬁle and the malware itself. The malware is now
ready to harvest the user’s personal information. During the malware update process, the
following changes were observed on the ﬁle system:
1. A new folder is created at the path C:/Windows/System32/lowsec. Hiding
techniques similar to those applied to the sdra64.exe are also applied to the cre-
ated folder.
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Command Purpose Return Value
1 Retrieve Zeus version number 4 bytes in a buffer
2 Retrieve name of the botnet Ascii string in buffer
3 Uninstall bot n/a
4 Open the local.ds ﬁle or create it
if it does not exist
n/a
5 Close the local.ds ﬁle n/a
6 Open the user.ds or create it if it
does not exist
n/a
7 Close the user.ds ﬁle n/a
8 Close the sdra64.exe ﬁle n/a
9 Open the sdra64.exe ﬁle n/a
10 Retrieve the sdra64.exe ﬁle path Wide character string
11 Retrieve the local.ds ﬁle path Wide character string
12 Retrieve the user.ds ﬁle path Wide character string
13 Crash the winlogon.exe process n/a
Table 3: List of Zeus Commands
2. Two new ﬁles, local.ds and user.ds, are created and placed in the new folder.
The ﬁle, local.ds, stores the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle, and the ﬁle, user.ds,
logs the stolen information until Zeus is ready to send it to the drop location.
The Zeus thread that resides in the winlogon.exe process contains the main func-
tionality, i.e., the brains, for a Zeus bot. It communicates and coordinates all the infected
processes using the named pipe _AVIRA_2109. Table 3 shows the list of the commands
that are supported by Zeus.
We now describe the remaining functions of Zeus which are aimed at hiding the three
ﬁles created during installation: local.ds, user.ds and sdra64.exe; and, control-
ling the user’s browsing experience including, but not limited to, harvesting the form input
ﬁelds submitted during browsing activities. Zeus achieves this by altering the functional-
ity of key Windows application programming interface (API) calls through function call
hooking [24].
Zeus is able to effectively hide ﬁles by intercepting Windows API calls, such as Find-
FirstFile and FindNextFile [39], and modifying what results are returned to the process
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that initiated the call. For example, when Explorer (explorer.exe) is displaying ﬁles
under the path C:/Windows/System32/ it would display all ﬁles to the user as this
is what is generally returned from the API calls; however, Zeus intercepts these calls and
hides sdra64.exe by intercepting and modifying the output. This effectively hides the
ﬁles from the list that is displayed to the user. This modiﬁcation occurs for every process
in the process table and makes sdra64.exe invisible to all processes that use Windows
API calls to access ﬁles on the computer. Sdra64.exe could still be viewed by processes
that do not make use of the ﬁle system functions; instead, they directly access the disk’s
ﬁle system structures. Unlike Explorer, RootkitRevealer [9], a program designed to reveal
stealthy activity in a system, is able to see that these ﬁles do in fact exist by performing a
raw scan of the disk instead of using the Windows API.
Zeus is able to modify the user’s browsing experience and steal sensitive information
by intercepting calls to Windows API Internet functions. These functions are used when
the browser communicates with the Internet. All data, such as form input ﬁelds being sent
to a website, or HTML received from a website, can be intercepted, recorded and modiﬁed.
This is how Zeus intercepts and records the form data and modiﬁes the page that the user
sees. These functions may be used by programs other than Internet explorer which would
then also be vulnerable. We take advantage of this later in this thesis in section 4.4.1.
Static Conﬁguration Structure
As mentioned in section 3.2, the Zeus botnet uses a conﬁguration ﬁle that contains static
information. Speciﬁcally, this part of the conﬁguration is stored inside the malware binary
ﬁle in a speciﬁc structure. During the de-obfuscation processes, this structure is recovered
and placed in virtual memory, 0x416000 in our analysis. All information in the structure
is completely de-obfuscated except for two URLs: url_compip and url_config.
These URLs can be de-obfuscated using Algorithm 3.4.2. The URL, url_compip, is the
41
          	 
   
       
              
                
                
                    
                    
                  
               
               
                
                
                  
                   
                  
                
               
                
                   
                 
                     
                 

























Figure 11: Static Conﬁguration Structure
web location to determine the IP address of the infected host, and url_config is the web
location to download the conﬁguration ﬁle for the botnet. The static conﬁguration structure
also contains an RC4 substitution table that is generated by the encryption key speciﬁed
in the conﬁguration ﬁle. Throughout our analysis, we noticed that the substitution table
was generated by RC4’s key-scheduling algorithm and then we veriﬁed that the encryption
employed by Zeus is done by the RC4 algorithm. See Figure 11 for a breakdown of the
static conﬁguration structure. This structure is of particular relevance because it provides
much of the botnet’s conﬁguration details including the timer variables, the conﬁguration
URL and the expanded RC4 substitution table; the timer variables can be used to write
42
network detection routines for this botnet’s activities, and the conﬁguration URL identiﬁes
a key server in the botnet where the bots retrieve the rest of the conﬁguration details.
3.4.3 Summary of Reverse Engineering Analysis
The analysis of Zeus showed the core functionality of the builder program and identiﬁed
the ﬁles created during an infection by observing its infection removal functionality. The
analysis also showed the layers of obfuscation employed by Zeus to frustrate analysis and
evade signature detection. Furthermore, the installation steps of the malware were illus-
trated. This provides researchers valuable insight into how malware authors make use of
operating system APIs to subvert control of active processes. The research also shows
both the basic functionality to hide its presence as well as the rootkit functionality em-
ployed to make the malware’s ﬁles virtually invisible to all processes and ultimately the
victim. Finally, the steps to extract the static conﬁguration information and the analysis of
its structure were presented. This information allows researchers to begin to identify the
networked infrastructure supporting the botnet. Combined with information extracted from
the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle, researchers now have a thorough understanding of all the
botnet components.
3.5 Automatic Key Extraction
The recovered static conﬁguration can be used in different ways to gain some control over
the botnet. One of the most valuable pieces of information is the substitution table which
can be used to decrypt all the communications of the Zeus botnet. Moreover, it can be
used to decrypt the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle as well as the stolen information. In order
to recover the static conﬁguration structure described above, we have to go through all the
de-obfuscation phases discussed in section 3.4.2. This requires executing the malware until
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it ﬁnishes all the de-obfuscation layers.
Using the Python [16] scripting language along with the IDAPython plugin [13], we
were able to emulate all the de-obfuscation routines and extract the substitution table from
the static conﬁguration structure. This substitution table allows for decrypting the botnet
communication trafﬁc and the encrypted ﬁles. Our experimental results show that any sub-
version of Zeus (v.1.2.x.x) can be fully analyzed using our methodology because it holds
the same logical blocks. We now explain the overall procedure to extract the substitution
table that resides in the static conﬁguration structure:
• Emulate the initial de-obfuscation routine:
1. Locate the EP and use it as a reference point for other memory locations;
2. Use a byte offset from the EP to determine the location of the ﬁrst de-obfuscation
routine’s 4-byte key;
3. Use a byte offset from the EP to determine the hard coded seed, in the case of
Zeus it is 0xE1;
4. Use a byte offset from the EP to determine the obfuscated code’s location;
5. Create a new memory segment at an address outside the program’s allocated
memory (e.g. 0x420000); and,
6. Perform the ﬁrst de-obfuscation routine as described in section 3.4.2 using the
seed value and the 4-byte key, and then write the result into the new segment.
The length of the result is always 0x1F5.
• Emulate the second de-obfuscation routine:
1. Use a byte offset from the start of the new segment (0x420000) to locate the:
(a) Missing data text block starting address;
(b) Missing data text block size;
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(c) Filler text block starting address; and,
(d) Filler text block size.
2. Create a new segment in an unused memory location (0x422000); and,
3. Perform the second de-obfuscation routine as described in section 3.4.2 and
write the results into the new segment.
• Emulate the third de-obfuscation routine:
1. Use a byte offset from the memory reference 0x420000 to locate the 8-byte
key; and,
2. Perform the third de-obfuscation routine as described in section 3.4.2.
• Emulate the fourth de-obfuscation routine:
1. Use the previous de-obfuscation results to modify the rest of the text/code and
data segments.
• Key extraction:
1. Extract the 256-byte substitution table located at memory address 0x41602A.
This key will allow for decrypting the botnet’s communication trafﬁc and all
the encrypted ﬁles.
As mentioned previously, this also enables the extraction of any information from the
static conﬁguration structure, such as the URL for the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle, exposing
one of the key servers in the botnet’s infrastructure. If one were to gain control of this server
and, in possession of the substitution table, they could reconﬁgure the bots. By creating a
new dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle, this would cause the bots to communicate with a new C&C
server under their control and effectively hijack control of the Zeus botnet. This is just one




In this section we reveal the structure of a communication sent by the bot to the C&C server
via a POST to /gate.php. We ﬁrst extracted a message from the network trace we took
in section 3.3. With the RC4 encryption key we extracted in section 3.5, we decrypted
the payload of this message and performed an analysis of the structure of the message. In
Figure 12, we illustrate the structure of the message as follows:
8E020000 0000000000000000 0C0000005B626D42FC682051D56D72A4
20270000 00000000 0D010000 0D010000
Message length Unknown Md5 hash value












4-bytes 4-bytes 4-bytes 4-bytes
4-bytes 8-bytes 16-bytes
Figure 12: A Decrypted Sample Message
1. The ﬁrst 28-bytes is the message header. The ﬁrst 4-bytes is the message length and
the last 16-bytes is an MD5 hash of rest of the message.
2. The body of the message may contain any number of message entries consisting of:
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(a) A 16-byte entry header where the ﬁrst 4-bytes determine the type of the entry.
This information is used by the control panel to determine in which table to save
the information. The length of the entry is determined by the bytes beginning
at byte eight; and,
(b) The stolen information or status information of the bot.
A key observation resulting from our analysis is that the encrypted communications of
the Zeus botnet are vulnerable to the RC4 keystream reuse attack. Because a new initial-
ization vector (IV) is not setup in every session, i.e., the same RC4 keystream is reused
to encrypt all messages. This vulnerability is similar to the attacks on the Wired Equiv-
alency Privacy (WEP) protocol [14], which would allow an interested party to break the
encryption of intercepted packets with relative ease.
3.7 Summary
The Zeus crimeware toolkit is an advanced tool used to generate very effective botnets
that facilitate criminal activities for ﬁnancial gain. The generated bot executables employ
stealthy rootkit technology to evade detection of the malware on the host. In addition,
the use of encrypted HTTP messages for communication makes it difﬁcult to detect at the
network level. Finally, the many layers of malware obfuscation further frustrate analysis
efforts and make writing signatures more difﬁcult.
In this chapter, we:
1. Provided an overview of the functionality of the Zeus crimeware toolkit;
2. Analyzed communications between the command-and-control (C&C) server and the
infected hosts. The sequence of communications was illustrated, revealing the peri-
odic nature of transmissions.
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3. Presented a detailed reverse engineering analysis of the Zeus crimeware toolkit to
unveil its underlying architecture and aid in mitigation efforts. This analysis illus-
trated the obfuscation Zeus employs and described the installation steps the malware
takes upon infection of the host. We also revealed the static conﬁguration structure
from the binary;
4. Designed a tool to automate the recovery of the encryption key and the extraction of
the conﬁguration information from the bot executable; and,
5. Provided a breakdown for the structure of the Zeus botnet network messages where
we identiﬁed a vulnerability.
The analysis of the C&C communications indicates that the RC4 algorithm is imple-
mented insecurely making it vulnerable to a keystream reuse attack. In addition to the
knowledge of the messaging structure, one can launch active countermeasures by interact-
ing with the botnet’s servers using the extracted encryption key. For example, by injecting
falsiﬁed information into botnet communications for various purposes, such as defaming
the botnet business model, reduces the effectiveness of the botnet. This attack is later de-
scribed in Chapter 4. Future work could be to use the mechanism to extract encryption keys




We have introduced the botnet toolkit problem and described the capabilities of the ﬁnan-
cially motivated Zeus crimeware toolkit. The Zeus analysis showed the difﬁculty in reverse
engineering due to the sophistication of its obfuscation and the use of encryption. This
motivated us to pursue an approach that could make use of the information learned from
reverse engineering and address the problem of botnet toolkits as a whole. In this chapter,
we introduce a botnet toolkit defamation process to target the proﬁt model of these toolkits.
4.1 Introduction
Inspired by the bottom-up control of a biological food chain [52], we propose an approach
of defeating a botnet toolkit through ﬁnancial discouragement or prosecution of its end-
users in order to defame and ultimately affect the top of the food chain, the malware authors.
We ﬁrst describe the Internet black market model for stolen credentials. Next, we present a
generic framework describing the proposed approach and its two variations that defame a
botnet toolkit from the security and proﬁtability perspectives. To make the concepts more
concrete, we then present a case study of the approach used on the Zeus crimeware toolkit
analyzed in Chapter 3. For extracting necessary information for the defaming approach,
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we demonstrate two methodologies, namely, reverse engineering and behavioural analysis
in the case study.
Chapter Organization: In section 4.2 we describe the Internet black market model
our framework targets. Section 4.3, gives an overview of the defamation approach and its
effects on the Internet black market. In section 4.4, we present a case study of how to apply
this framework to the Zeus botnet toolkit. The following section, section 4.4.1, describes
behavioural methodologies we tested on Zeus to invoke the framework. And ﬁnally, in
section 4.5, we discuss several practical considerations with respect to our framework and
summarize the chapter.
4.2 Internet Black Market Model
In creating the black market model we adapt equations 2 and 3 we reviewed in section 2.3.1,
to address other stolen sensitive information such as credit card numbers and online ﬁnan-
cial institution credentials. We assume a proﬁt model with four players: the malware au-
thors who design and sell botnet toolkits; the botmasters who purchase the toolkit and use it
to steal credentials; the buyers who purchase the stolen credentials in the hopes of making
a proﬁt; and, the money mules who eventually withdraw funds and then transfer, minus a
commission, the funds back to the buyers.
The parameters of this proﬁt model are:
1. A, the average amount stolen per credential. This amount should stay constant;
2. n, the number of credentials;
3. Cp, the commission, as a percentage of the amount stolen, that the money mule keeps
from each transaction;
4. S, the sale price per credential in the black market;
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5. M , the purchase price of the botnet toolkit in the black market; and,
6. N , the number of sales of the botnet toolkit.
For each player we describe the proﬁt model that will be affected by the proposed
framework:
The proﬁt model for the money mule is:
max (Profit_mule) = A× n× Cp (4)
The proﬁt model for the buyer of the credentials is:
max (Profit_buyer) = A× n× (1− Cp)− S × n (5)
The proﬁt model for the botmaster is:
max (Profit_botmaster) = S × n−M (6)
The frequency with which the botmaster must pay M is dependant on how often new
releases of the toolkit are purchased.
Finally, the proﬁt model for the toolkit author is:
max (Profit_author) = M ×N (7)
4.3 Framework
The goal of the proposed framework is to discredit a botnet toolkit and ultimately reduce its
sales to those who wish to create botnets. We attack the toolkits credibility on two fronts:



























































Figure 13: Botnet Toolkit Defamation Process
ﬁnancial services credentials, and other sensitive information; and, security of the toolkit
in respect to its ability to protect its users from prosecution. We propose two variants to
this approach: reducing a toolkit’s proﬁtability by ﬂooding it with false information, and
making the toolkit insecure by submitting honeytokens to the botnets that aid in the arrest
and prosecution of the end-users of this stolen information. The framework is illustrated
in Figure 13, which shows the two variants and the surrounding process, which will be
explained in details in the following.
4.3.1 First Variant
The intent of the ﬁrst variant is to reduce the proﬁtability of using a Zeus botnet for cre-
dential stealing by diluting the stolen identity information with specially crafted, false cre-
dentials. It works as follows:
1. Monitor current botnet toolkit trends and select the leading toolkit used for identity
theft and fraudulent transactions as our target;
2. Acquire samples of botnet binaries from honeypots, antivirus vendors, ﬁnancial in-
stitutions and security forums;
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3. Determine targeted websites and targeted ﬁelds by analyzing malware samples;
4. Generate false identity information; and,
5. Submit identity information to the botmasters through the attack network.
The fraudulent credentials, along with legitimate credentials, are then sold on the black
market. When the purchaser attempts to use the credentials, they will discover that many of
them are invalid. Diluting the credentials affects the proﬁt model by reducing the number
of valid credentials used to gain a proﬁt. This introduces a new variable into the equation,
Pf , the probability that a credential is fake. The money mule was only ever paid for funds
that were transferred to their account and would likely not be aware of fake credentials.
The proﬁt model for the buyer will be affected as follows:
max (Profit_buyer) = A× n× (1− Pf )× (1− Cp)− S × n (8)
The result of diluting the information sold, has a cascading effect; each subsequent
party discredits the next party in the chain due to the loss in proﬁts. Firstly, the purchased
credentials generate less than expected proﬁts for the buyer as many of the credentials are
false. This is reﬂected in the new formula through a reduction of proﬁts resulting from
1 − Pf . Next, the buyer will discredit the seller, who is also the botmaster, in the Internet
black market where the purchase was made because many of the credentials purchased
were false. This will affect future proﬁts by either reducing the sale price per credential, S,
and/or reducing total sales, n, as this seller’s wares are less reliable. Finally, the sellers, or
botmasters, will attribute the problem to the toolkit used to create their botnet and discredit
this toolkit in the black market due to its poor performance. In addition, botmasters will no
longer purchase toolkit updates or future releases of that speciﬁc brand or author. This will
affect future sales of the toolkit, by its author, resulting from the reduced sale price of the
toolkit, M , and/or the reduced total sales, N .
53
We now establish a negative effect not just on the economy of the Internet black mar-
ket, but directly on the incomes of the malware authors. If future sales of the toolkit can be
sufﬁciently reduced, then the authors may decide that supporting their toolkit is no longer
proﬁtable. We assume that authors of these toolkits are the minority of Internet criminals
and if, through these attacks, we can dissuade them from creating botnet toolkits for mate-
rial gain, we will reduce the amount of innovation these botnets possess in future attacks;
therefore, making them obsolete. In addition, this approach may frustrate potential botmas-
ters from purchasing toolkits by continually reducing the effectiveness of the botnets that
these toolkits create. This framework repeats, re-evaluating the currently most prevalent
and dangerous botnet toolkit and reapplying the approach. As a toolkit loses its popularity,
the framework adjusts to tackle the next leading threat.
4.3.2 Second Variant
The second variant of our framework is an extension of the ﬁrst. The intent of this sec-
ondary approach is to harm the sense of security for the end-users, the money mules, of
the stolen information. This approach contains one additional step that occurs after the
credentials propagate through the Internet black market:
6. Make arrests when the fraudulent accounts are used.
To facilitate this additional step, the fraudulent accounts must be, or appear as, real,
active accounts with accessible funds. Coordination between law enforcement and the
various ﬁnancial institutions is paramount for this approach to succeed. The criminals
must be convinced that the accounts are valid and the transactions are working. This can be
accomplished by providing funds to dummy accounts under the control of law enforcement
of ﬁnancial institutions. Law enforcement’s role is to monitor these accounts and attempt
to arrest individuals as they try to extract the funds. Funds can be extracted by performing
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online purchases, transferring funds to other accounts (e.g., ﬁnancial institutions or Paypal)
and through wire-transfers. We postulate that, with foreknowledge of the accounts being
used, there is an increased likelihood that law enforcement can successfully apprehend and
charge money mules with an offence.
To analyze the impact of apprehension and prosecution of money mules, we operate
under the assumption that the players in the identiﬁed Internet black market will only con-
tinue these activities if it remains proﬁtable for them to do so. We simplify the equation 1,
reviewed in section 2.3, to only address monetary beneﬁt, Mb, the opportunity cost of con-
viction, Ocm, the probability of arrest, Pa, and the probability of conviction, Pc, excluding
the psychological beneﬁts and opportunity costs. Therefore, a cybercrime occurs if:
Mb > OcmPaPc (9)
We assume a direct correlation between the probability of arrest and conviction, and the
number of transfers a money mule performs. Therefore, this correlation does not affect the
ratio in equation 9. The increase in probability of conviction resulting from our framework
is not offset by an increase in the money mules proﬁts. In order for the money mules to stay
proﬁtable, we can assume they will demand a higher commission. In addition, convictions
will remove some end-users from further involvement in the black market. Reduction in
supply of potential end-users, as well as increased concern over security will raise the
cost of hiring money mules; this is reﬂected in an increased commission, Cp, charged for
services. Increased costs, in turn, reduce future proﬁts of the buyers; and, much like the
ﬁrst variant, these buyers will continue to propagate the effects of arrests within their ranks,
by attacking the credibility of the source of the identity information they purchased. This
impugns the reputations of the sellers of the stolen identity information and drives down
the market price for the information. Finally, sellers of stolen identity information, who are
also botmasters, will discredit the toolkits they used to create their botnets. With a damaged
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reputation, the toolkit will lose future sales.
4.3.3 Technical Approach
We now discuss methods to determine the targeted websites and their application in defam-
ing Zeus. The ﬁrst method of identifying these websites, is to reverse engineer malware
samples to determine the targeted sites and, in particular, the identity information they are
after. In the case of botnet toolkits, malware samples generated by the same version of the
toolkit will have a similar code structure even though they may appear completely different
at ﬁrst glance. This will allow a reverse engineering analysis to be compiled into scripts that
may be run on each malware sample to repeat the reverse engineering steps. In section 4.4,
we describe our results from such an analysis. In section 4.4.1, we also discuss behavioural
methodologies to determine the targeted websites that stemmed from our analysis of Zeus
and have roots in side-channel attacks [41]. These methodologies look for anomalous sys-
tem activity related to the browser process to indicate when web page harvesting occurs. In
particular, we are trying to determine when the malware stores identity information on the
hard drive prior to sending it to the botmaster.
4.4 Zeus Case Study
We now illustrate the technical details of the framework through examples of how it would
be applied to the Zeus botnet toolkit. This section includes the steps needed to inﬁltrate the
botnet and inject fake credentials into the black market, and the behavioural methodologies
that could be applied to future toolkits. We limit our analysis of Zeus to extracting the
encryption key and the targeted website URLs for use in our framework. With these two
pieces of information, we are able to join an existing Zeus botnet, pretend to be an active
member, and submit the falsiﬁed identity information.
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We use scripts written during the reverse engineering analysis to automatically extract
the encryption key and the conﬁguration information embedded in the bot binary. This
information directs us to a URL, which contains the dynamic conﬁguration for the botnet.
This ﬁle must ﬁrst be decrypted using the extracted key. It contains a list of targeted URLs
and their respective extraction rules, blacklisted websites and websites that have injected
web content.
We begin the process by downloading the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle from the web lo-
cation url_config. Once downloaded, the dynamic conﬁguration ﬁle can be decrypted
using the RC4 algorithm with the substitution table provided. Next, we extract the URLs
that are being targeted from this ﬁle. These URLs satisfy step 3 of our framework and are
the input to the identity information generator in step 4. We now use a machine, infected
with the binary sample from which we extracted the URLs, and submit our generated iden-
tity information. The Zeus bot will detect the website, extract the submitted credentials and
send them to the botmaster. Figure 13 outlines the rest of the propagation process. Accord-
ing to our model, after the botmaster receives the credentials, they will sell the information
in the black market to buyers of the stolen information. Buyers will transfer funds to the
money mules, using the stolen credentials. At this stage, law enforcement agencies may
perform arrests. By monitoring the use of the credentials injected in the botnet by the
framework, law enforcement agencies can target the money mules who receive the funds
and perform transfers back to the buyers.
4.4.1 Behavioural Methodologies
Although reverse engineering provided us with exact results for the targeted URLs, it can
be a time-consuming process, as malware authors utilize obfuscation techniques to prevent
binary snooping. Since we are interested in applying our method to all families of malware,
not just Zeus, we pursued behavioural methodologies in the hopes of automating a process
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to extract targeting rules from malware samples.
Behavioural methodologies may allow us to determine the URLs for any malware fam-
ily, as they detect the URLs independently of the binary structure and the obfuscation tech-
niques employed by the malware. These techniques may aid in the proposed framework by
providing the details of precisely how a website is targeted, including the exact ﬁelds and
inputs necessary to submit the generated credentials through the framework.
We evaluate various techniques to detect anomalous activity that, if successful, cover a
broader range of malware . We test these methodologies on Zeus to check for their validity.
Assumptions
We make the following assumptions in order to create a data stealing model:
1. Data is stolen when a web browser submits information to a website;
2. The malware will be selective in what data it steals either through positive action, by
specifying websites from which to harvest, or blacklisting websites whose informa-
tion is not wanted. We make this assumption as recording all form grabbing malware
may be less stealthy than only stealing what is of use. For example, the botmaster
may not want web searches performed by the user as they play no part in the proﬁt
model.
3. Botmasters may also want to extract supplementary information from websites to
determine if the captured form information is valuable. For instance, when a user
logs into a banking website and views their account, the malware will record the login
credentials and, if instructed, will also record the account balance. The botmaster is
then aware of available funds without having to log in to the account and may use
this information when they attempt to sell the credentials.
From our assumptions we have created the following data stealing model:
58
1. Data is recorded when a browser submits a POST, with the user input, to a website.
Data may also be recorded during a GET, when query ﬁelds are present in the URL.
Although malware may have this capability, it is unlikely that sensitive information
is contained within a query string;
2. The malware will only record information for a subset of websites the victim visits;
3. Additional form ﬁelds and text/images may be presented to the victim by modifying
the page content before it is rendered by the browser. The malware will use a rule set
to determine which page to inject the additional information and where on the page
to put it. The form ﬁelds may be used to gather additional personal information from
the victim; and,
4. Data from a rendered page can be extracted with a pattern matching rule set.
Test Methods
From our proposed data stealing model, we are interested in detecting when a webpage’s
form and page data are extracted, and when additional page content is injected. In the case
of Zeus, these behaviours would demonstrate the webpage is not blacklisted. A series of
tests is run where a web browser navigates to potentially targeted websites using a system
that is in a clean or infected state for the purpose of extracting behavioural characteris-
tics for each website visited. When sufﬁcient difference is found in the measured metrics
between the system states, we count it as evidence that the current browsing actions are
being targeted. The extraction process would, from a set of websites, determine when a
page is blacklisted, when a page’s speciﬁc details are extracted, or when a page’s content is
modiﬁed. This effectively creates a targeting conﬁguration model of the malware samples
analyzed. A list of potentially targeted websites is required to be used during the tests. To
reduce effort on compiling this list, we let attackers determine the targeted domains through
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their phishing efforts which are then compiled into a list of phishing brands. Since the pur-
pose of phishing is to also harvest identity information, then the targeted brands should be
very similar, or likely a superset, to those targeted by identity theft botnets. This approach
is left as future work.
We test various behavioural methodologies which use anomaly detection of windows
performance variables gathered with PerfMon [49] and of processor activity gathered with
ProcMon [49]. From PerfMon we test approaches that are based on performance monitor-
ing counters that are speciﬁc to the web browser process or to the system as a whole.
• Disk read bytes / second
• Disk write bytes / second
• Processor utilization
• Processor utilization by the web browser
• Web browser read bytes / second
• Web browser write bytes / second
For the purposes of Zeus, and other HTTP botnets, we monitored writes to the ﬁlesys-
tem using ProcMon. Anomalous ﬁlesystem writes may indicate stolen information being
stored for later transmission to the botmaster. For our tests, we utilized a Windows XP
virtual machine that is in one of the following ﬁve states, referred to as state 1 through 5:
1. Clean: the machine has not been infected with Zeus.
2. Infected w/ no targeting: the machine has been infected with Zeus; however, no
speciﬁc rules for the test URL have been included.
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3. Infected w/ injected content: the machine has been infected with Zeus and rules to
inject an additional login form ﬁeld are included in Zeus’ conﬁguration for the test
URL.
4. Infected w/ page content extraction rules: the machine has been infected with Zeus,
and rules to record speciﬁc page content are included in Zeus’ conﬁguration for the
test URL.
5. Infected w/ URL ﬁltered: the machine has been infected with Zeus and blacklist rules
are included in Zeus’ conﬁguration to not record form information for the test URL.
Two general tests were run on the virtual machine to evaluate the behavioural method-
ologies. They are designed to evaluate if a given test URL exhibits anomalous behaviour
in one of the monitoring tools, PerfMon or ProcMon, during browsing activities.
Test 1
1. Start the web browser.
2. Start monitoring tool (PerfMon or ProcMon).
3. Navigate to a test URL.
4. Stop monitoring tool.
Test 1 can be performed on states 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the virtual machine and is used to
determine if a URL has additional content injected into its page and/or if a URL has page
data being recorded by the malware.
Test 2
1. Start the web browser.
2. Navigate to a test URL which contains form ﬁelds.
61
3. Start monitoring tool (PerfMon or ProcMon).
4. Fill out form ﬁelds.
5. Submit form.
6. Stop monitoring tool.
Test 2 can be performed on states 1, 2 and 5 of the virtual machine and is used to determine
if a URL’s form data is being recorded.
We made use of two different websites in the following experiments as we were in-
terested in identifying different behaviours. We used a website with a login form for Ex-
periments 1 and 3, as they require form-ﬁeld entries; whereas in Experiment 2, we use a
website of mostly textual content as we were interested in identifying when page content
was extracted. These tests are not correlated to one another; rather, they are used to identify
different mechanisms of the data stealing model to further aid in automating extraction of
targeting rules from malware samples.
• Experiment 1: Navigate to GMail [20] using state 1, 2 and 3 of the virtual machine.
For each state we utilized Test 1 with mail.google.com as the URL. We ﬁrst
performed the test using ProcMon as the monitoring tool. We then repeated the
experiment using PerfMon as the monitoring tool and repeated this second test three
times. In addition, for each of the states we captured the page source.
In this experiment, we want to test if we can identify when additional page content
is injected into the page displayed to the user. For state 3, we modiﬁed webin-
jects.txt to insert an additional form ﬁeld into GMail for the victim’s SIN. This
is similar to the scenario where an attacker may want to gain additional identity in-
formation from a victim.
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• Experiment 2: Navigate to Wikinews [17] using state 1, 2 and 4 of the virtual ma-
chine. For each state we utilized Test 1 with en.wikinews.org as the URL. We
ﬁrst performed the test using ProcMon as the monitoring tool. We then repeated the
experiment using PerfMon as the monitoring tool and repeated this second test three
times.
In this experiment, we want to test if we can identify when page content is being
extracted by the malware. For state 4, we modiﬁed webinjects.txt to extract
information from the webpage displayed to the victim. This is similar to the sce-
nario where an attacker may want to gain sensitive information about a user’s online
account that is displayed after authentication (e.g., online bank account total).
• Experiment 3: Log into GMail using states 1, 2 and 5 of the virtual machine. For each
state we utilized Test 2 with mail.google.com as the URL. We ﬁrst performed
the test using ProcMon as the monitoring tool. We then repeated the experiment
using PerfMon as the monitoring tool and performed this second test three times.
In this experiment, we want to test if we can identify when form data is being ex-
tracted by the malware. For state 5, we modiﬁed webinjects.txt to not extract
information from GMail. As Zeus by default extracts all form data, this scenario is
testing for blacklisting.
The results of running the experiment on the different states are then compared to the
speciﬁc conﬁguration rules used in the malware.
Results
We ﬁrst examine Experiment 1. The result from running the experiment with ProcMon
provides a list of paths where Internet Explorer [38] wrote data. Since Experiment 1 ex-
ecutes a navigation experiment where the machine is either in one of state 1, 2, or 3, it is
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unsurprising there are no anomalous entries in the path lists between the three states (see ta-
bles 4, 5 and 6 in the Appendices). We deﬁne what an anomalous path is in the appropriate
experiment.
When executing the experiment with PerfMon we are not provided with any concrete
conclusions as to whether page content has been injected and displayed to the user. We
believe there are two main reasons this experiment failed. First, the recorded metrics are
far too coarse for detecting the subtle system changes that injected page content produces.
PerfMon is designed as a system performance monitor meant to aid in detecting perfor-
mance issues. Its detectors give results that are an average over a time period that can
only be as short as one second. The potential spikes in system activity we are looking for
are likely lost in this timeframe. Second, we observed that system resources as a whole
increased when the system is infected by malware. Any change in those metrics that is a
result of the malware actively injecting content or extracting information, as is the case of
the other experiments, is lost in the increased overall activity produced by the malware’s
rootkit functionality. It is our belief that this is endemic of all rootkits as they attach them-
selves to all or most running processes and increase overall system usage.
For this experiment we also recorded the page source for mail.google.com. Even
though Zeus can inject any type of page content, our main concern is determining when
additional form ﬁelds have been injected. A simple side-by-side text comparison using
KDiff3 [12] shows that, in state 3, an additional ﬁeld has been added to the login form (see
Figure 14).
In Experiment 2, we are provided with some useful results from ProcMon (see ta-
bles 7, 8 and 9 in the Appendices). The path list for the three states is very similar as
the folder structure and ﬁlenames have little difference. The one exception is a set of
writes to C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/user.ds. As mentioned in the Zeus
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Figure 14: KDiff3 Comparison
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case study, this is the location where extracted page and form data is stored prior to be-
ing transmitted to the botmaster. We can deduce that information from the web location
en.wikinews.org was in fact extracted and submitted to the botmaster.
Again, PerfMon did not provide useful output for deducing when a page is harvested
and the information is stored on the local hard drive. The shear number of writes that occur
when viewing a website effectively mask this behaviour. In addition, page caching and
new content being sent on subsequent visits adds further ambiguity to the results. Creating
a more controlled environment where we cache the web pages content and ensure that each
subsequent visit does not receive variable data may help to reﬁne the results; however, it is
likely still that these performance metrics will not prove useful.
The purpose of Experiment 3 is to determine when form data is captured. As Zeus cap-
tures all form data by default, we are in fact determining when form data is being speciﬁ-
cally excluded. Regardless, running the experiment on a set of potentially targeted websites
will return a subset of sites that have their data being recorded. As in Experiment 2, we
again are provided with a set of writes to C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/user.ds
(see tables 10, 11 and 12 in the Appendices), indicating that either form information is be-
ing recorded; and/or, the page, rendered in the web browser after the form data is submitted,
has data being extracted by the malware. Also in state 5, there is no data written to disk con-
ﬁrming that blacklisting mail.google.com did indeed cause the expected behaviour.
We can safely deduce that form data has been captured during the experiment, while in
state 2, as it is unlikely that the botmaster is only interested in information in the rendered
page resulting from a log in and not the login credentials themselves. As in the previous
experiments, PerfMon was ineffective for the same reasons.
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Extraction Process
We can partially automate the process to extract a malware’s conﬁguration using the Web-
Spec API from Web Application Testing in Java (Watij) [28], a cross-platform open source
java project that enables easy scripting of popular web browsers. We run the following
algorithm multiple times on each sample page and store the results for later comparison.
1. Open web browser.
2. Start PerfMon.
3. Navigate to web location.
4. Stop PerfMon.
5. Repeat steps 2-4 for each web location.
6. Close web browser.
Step 3 of our algorithm is more complicated than simply navigating to a web location.
There may be necessary authentication steps that require test credentials provided by a
potentially targeted company. Using the Webspec API we can create scripts to successfully
navigate these sites and incorporate them into our algorithm. These same scripts would be
used during the proposed defaming framework to submit credentials to the botmasters. See
Figure 15 for the Java code to log into a PayPal account using a web browser, and recording
a system log. The output is then converted into a comma-separated-value (CSV) ﬁle for
further analysis. We only monitor disk writes that are initiated by Internet Explorer and we
specify this conﬁguration in ProcmonConfiguration.pmc.
We run this script on each of the speciﬁed virtual machine states in our experiments to
generate our test data. In addition, after step 3, we can optionally save the page source for
use in detecting web injects using the function source() exposed by the Webspec API.
67
// 1. Open JExplorer.
WebSpec spec = new WebSpec().ie();










// 3. Navigate to website and wait for load to complete.
spec.open("[URL]");
spec.busy();





// Submit login credentials.
spec.find("input").with("type==‘submit’")
.with("name==‘submit.x’").click();




// 5. Close JExplorer
spec.closeAll();











Figure 15: Web Navigation Testing Script
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After gathering the test data we can execute a test to determine whether information
stealing occurs. The process takes the output from the Webspec executions and searches
for the path C:/WINDOWS/system32/lowsec/user.ds. This path is speciﬁc to the
malware samples we analyzed and would need to be conﬁgured for each sample. If the
path is detected, then an extraction occurred and the test URL is added to the site list for
our defamation attack.
To determine web page injections in an automated fashion, a comparison between the
source collected from state 1 and 3 is needed. Comparing hash values of the sources col-
lected is sufﬁcient to indicate injected content, however, if the injected content includes a
form ﬁeld we require this additional information to instrument our attack. After conﬁrming
the sources are different by a hash check, we perform an additional check for those test
sites that include a form submission process. The form used for submission in state 1 and
3 is compared by extracting the form ﬁelds from each source and comparing the result set.
Additional ﬁelds in the state 3 version would then indicate form injection and provide our
attack with an additional input requirement. Future work is needed to automate this process
and further evaluate its effectiveness as explained in the following section.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we introduced a framework to combat identity theft toolkits. In it, we per-
formed an economic analysis of the effects of defamation. The technical challenge of this
approach is to determine the websites that are targeted by instances of a botnet toolkit. We
discussed reverse engineering results from an analysis we performed on Zeus that allows us
to automate this process for Zeus binary samples. In addition, behavioural methodologies
were proposed and evaluated.
The advantage of this framework is that it targets the weakest point of a botnet food
chain (the end-users). The cascading effect will eventually affect the top level of the chain
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(the toolkit author) by diminishing his/her proﬁts from future sales of the toolkit. In ad-
dition, since we are attacking the business model, malware authors would need to change
how they do business to circumvent our attack, which, we postulate, is more difﬁcult than
modifying the implementation of their toolkits.
A major obstacle with our approach is that it is unclear whether we are diluting many
botnets with false credentials from many botmasters, or many botnets from one or a few
botmasters. Even if we collect many binaries that use different C&C servers, they all may
belong to the same botmaster. Diluting the botnets that belong to our collected samples
may only be affecting one or a few botmasters business models while other botmasters that
use the same toolkit are unaffected. Currently we rely on an assumption that the most active
botnets will likely be represented in our acquired malware set and so, we would have an
affect on the most egregious actors and therefore the most impact in the marketplace.
As this approach is an exploration on paper, future work would be needed to provide
further details on implementing the attack. For the ﬁrst step, Internet black market forums
and IRC channels can be monitored to identify what the popular toolkits are. For identi-
fying targeted websites, further exploration into behavioural methodologies may provide
more useful results. The main ﬁnding from our behavioural methodologies was the cor-
relation between ﬁle writes to the local data storage and data being harvested from either
form ﬁelds or page content. Although this provided some success, our ﬁndings did not
illustrate when, in general, information is harvested. For example, if the malware does not
write to disk, but rather immediately transmits to the drop location, then our ﬁnding would
not apply. One potential method is to look for anomalous behaviour that occurs when op-
erating system APIs that are known to be hooked by malware are called. Finally, further
monitoring of black market forums and IRC channels may provide law enforcement with
additional information that would be useful during apprehension, such as the geographic
region in which the mule operates and which wire-transfer service they will use.
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To evaluate the approach and the effectiveness of the attack, two locations may be mon-
itored. The ﬁrst is the same forums and IRC channels where popular toolkits are identiﬁed;
the second is the drop locations where the stolen information is sent. By monitoring these
two locations, one could determine at what rate false information needs to arrive relative
to all information being sent to the drop location, in order to have an effect on the value of




The Internet continues to be plagued by malicious actors using botnets to perform identity
theft and other attacks. While many solutions have been proposed, this problem is still
prevalent.
In this thesis, we provided background on botnets and the various attacks they can
launch. In addition, we looked at the existing research to address this problem. Botnet
detection through host-based and network-based detection was also described. Moreover,
we discussed the Internet black market and its motivations, given that the modern botnet is
ﬁnancially driven and is involved in the black market at many levels.
One of the main contributions for this thesis was a reverse engineering analysis of the
Zeus crimeware toolkit. We described the functionality of a particular botnet, Zeus, and
provided an in-depth analysis of its process to infect a machine, harvest a victim’s private
information and communicate it back to the C&C server. The power and simplicity of op-
erating the toolkit was highlighted, as was the sophistication it employed to evade detection
and frustrate analysis efforts. We also presented an approach to extract key conﬁguration
information from the malware that reveals the C&C server and other key servers necessary
to operate a Zeus botnet. We designed a tool to automate this extraction using emulation
techniques that do not require the malware to be running in a system. We also breakdown
72
the structure of the Zeus botnet communications. An advantage of using this tool to unpack
a binary and extract information is that, if ported into a standalone application, it can be ex-
ecuted as a batch process. This could be used to quickly identify all encryption keys, drop
locations and C&C servers used by malware that has targeted an organization. An orga-
nization can use this information to block trafﬁc and determine what information is being
stolen. A point of interest is the weak implementation of RC4 that Zeus employs. This
shows that while malware authors produce sophisticated code they have vulnerabilities in
their programs much like the legitimate software industry. This thesis provides valuable
insight into future reverse engineering efforts and combating newer versions of Zeus and
its relatives through new means of detection and mitigation.
The Zeus analysis showed the difﬁculty in reverse engineering due to the sophistication
of its obfuscation and the use of encryption. This led us toward the other main contribution
of this thesis, a novel approach to defaming botnet toolkits: making use of the information
learned from reverse engineering and addressing the problem of botnet toolkits as a whole.
Two economic attacks were proposed targeting end-users of stolen credentials to create
a cascading effect on the ultimate target, the authors of botnet toolkits. Attacking the
Internet black market and ultimately the wallets of malicious actors may prove to be a
strong approach to handling these threats since, although, malware functionality can be
changed, modifying the business model may prove more difﬁcult. A case study using Zeus
was explored and various behavioural methodologies were tested but showed initial success
in only a few experiments.
Reverse engineering malware is a time consuming task. Future work is to develop
automated techniques that can improve the efﬁciency of malware analysis. In the Zeus
analysis, the tool which automates extraction of conﬁguration information relies on the
disassembler, IDAPro. To truly create a batch process, the functionality would need to be
migrated into a standalone application. This would require additional logic at the start of
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the tool to identify the entry point in the binary executable ﬁle.
In addition, the knowledge gained from our analysis can be used to interact with a botnet
for a variety of purposes including our defamation approach. Falsiﬁed information could
be submitted directly to the botmaster by crafting packets using the structure we deduced
from analysis and the extracted encryption key. Additional research could be performed to
explore other economic attacks against the Internet black market and speciﬁcally against
the malware authors whose wares enable these sophisticated attacks. Evaluating the effec-
tiveness of these attacks remains an outstanding question. Creating tools to automatically
monitor and mine information, such as the popularity of a toolkit, would provide valuable
input for any evaluation. While the behavioural methodologies only provided some initial
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